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Abstract
The World Wide Web is one of the most signiﬁcant multi-
media applicationsever developed— andthereforesecur-
ing the web is one of the most pressing problems. There
exista numberof approachesforsecuringthe World Wide
Web which, however, usually pursue what one might call
a low level approach without being able to give adequate
consideration to the speciﬁc requirements of this multi-
media (or hypertext) system.
The subject of this paper is the realization of an ade-
quate security system, which is capable of detecting the
different media and structures within hypertext systems
and therefore apply different cryptographic mechanisms
to them; this resulted in the development of the system
PLASMA(Platformfor Secure Multimedia Applications).
PLASMA is a security platform designed within the frame
of the Berkom R
&D-programme at the Fraunhofer–IGD
in Darmstadtwhose prototypewas developedto providea
means for secure multimedia telecommunications. In or-
der to demonstrate the capabilities of PLASMA, it was in-
tegrated into a W3 scenario. The advantages of PLASMA
when used in the World Wide Web as well as the archi-
tecture created for the integration process are described in
the following section.
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1 Introduction
Secure telecommunications is a subject which has been
addressed extensively in the past; the same is true for the
secure World Wide Web. An overview of this topic may
be found in the paper by P. Lipp and V. Hassler [10]. Pro-
tocol realizations such as SHTTP [14] or SSLeay [13], an
implementation of SSL [5], are examples of the prior art
in this ﬁeld.
Yet even in 1996 B. Fernandez noted in [3] that these
works concentrated primarily on low level security;t h e s e
approaches do not address the multimedia or structural
elements of the application documents. This is an area
which has received scant attention in the past and on
which this paper tries to shed some light.
From [3]: “Hypertext systems encompass multimedia
documents with hyperlinks connecting to other
similar documents. Multimedia documents and
their hyperlinks may contain a variety of media
including audio, video, animation, graphics and
text. Extensive research is going on about hyper-
text/multimedia systems as they are the upcom-
ing platform for worldwide transfer of informa-
tion. With this rapid growth in hypertext docu-
ments and WWW sites, their security is a top pri-
ority issue. Compared with other topics, this is a
relatively neglected aspect. This is strange because
the richness and variety of multimedia information
provides with many opportunities to access unau-
thorized information. Most of the work until now
has focused on methods to protect the information
or authenticate the users using cryptographic mea-
sures. While these are certainly useful, they are too
low level to control access based on logical proper-
ties of the document information.”
To overcome these deﬁciencies a security platform
PLASMA for multimedia telecommunications and appli-
cationshasbeen designedand implementedfor differenti-
ating between media and structural componentsand using
different cryptographic algorithms accordingly. For the
purpose of demonstrating the functionality of PLASMA,
the World Wide Web was chosen. The reasons for this
were that on one hand more and more transactions occur
via the web, makingthe WWW one of the principalappli-cationsin electroniccommunicationsoverall; on the other
hand the World Wide Web constitutes a multimedia sys-
tem as well as a hypertextsystem with componentswhich
can be distinguished by the structure of the application
documents.
PLASMA was a project within the R
&D–programme of
Deutsche Telekom Berkom GmbH, which is a subsidiary
of Deutsche Telekom AG. Deutsche Telekom has devel-
oped a product version of PLASMA which is based on
Deutsche Telekom’ssecurity technologyas well as the re-
sults of the PLASMA research project. PLASMA is cur-
rently available for severaloperating systems. In this con-
tribution all mentioning of PLASMA refer to the PLASMA
research project and the PLASMA prototype realized in
this project.
2 New requirements for a secure
WWW
The World Wide Web is a multimediahypertextsystem; it
consists of text documents including images as well as a
host of other documentsof varying structure and differing
media types.
For example, single words or simple buttons in a hyper-
text document may refer to different documents, images
or Java applications which are activated by a mouse click.
If the so–called hyperlink is activated, the corresponding
web server is contacted and the selected document is re-
quested by the client. This document may be another text
document, an image, a Java applet simulating a video or a
so–called form. Forms are sent to the client by the server,
ﬁlled out by the client and then returned to the server.
In the World Wide Web, text, images, Java applets, forms
etc. are transmitted, suggesting the use of different cryp-
tographic mechanisms for these differentmedia types and
structural elements. Image and video data may be pro-
tected differently from textual data. For example, it is of-
ten sufﬁcient to simply reduce the image quality of the
image data or to encrypt merely a segment of the image
(e.g. encrypting a face). Furthermore, image and video
data are of considerably larger volume than textual data
which may make the use of faster cryptographic algo-
rithms (which will then be usually less secure) neces-
sary. The divergentmedia and structures of an application
document or the various document types should also be
treated differently by a security platform.
Another layer of security is the protection of the entire
documentduringtransmission. A documentofa multime-
dia application is usually a composite of different media
types; yet it must be considered as a composite whole.
It is necessary to speciﬁcally associate media and crypto-
graphic protocols which determine the appropriate algo-
rithm for each media type. However, once the appropri-
ate cryptographic mechanisms for a media type within a
document have been determined, they cannot be changed
within that document context.
The selection of these security services should be per-
formed by the user since only he can decide on the ba-
sis of a speciﬁc document whether it should be signed or
merely be encrypted in transit — this makes user interac-
tions necessary.
Both are problems which are hardly if at all considered
in the current telecommunications systems yet are real-
ized in PLASMA. As a demonstration of these features,
PLASMA was integrated into the World Wide Web. The
thus developedsolution will now be described. The archi-
tecture to be presented itself does not offer new insights
into the subject of web security but does demonstrate a
meaningfulapplication for the security platform PLASMA
in the World Wide Web and the new concepts realized
within the platform, namely the idea of high level secu-
rity.
Furthermore, this implementation may be used in a real–
world scenario for securing communicationsin the World
Wide Web since
￿ PLASMA allows securing several simultaneous
communication sessions; this allows a web server
to serve several clients simultaneously using secure
connections; similarly a client is capable of starting
several simultaneous requests to different servers.
￿ It is possible to create the presented scenarios
(and the architecture presented therein) even when
ﬁrewalls (of the packet ﬁltering/stateful inspection
variety) are used to secure a corporate intranet.
PLASMA uses the standard HTTP protocol for tun-
neling its secure requests and replies thus facilitat-
ing real–world secured web communications[4].
￿ A basic functionality of any kind of cryptographic
systemsisa correctkeymanagement,i.e.theproper
administration and storage of the cryptographic
keys for each user. The current realization of the
key management subsystem in PLASMA conforms
to the X.509 authentication framework [15], thus
making for a clean implementation of this vital part
of a cryptographicsystem.3W h a t i s P LASMA?
3.1 Media and structure speciﬁc crypto-
graphic operations on application doc-
uments
PLASMA is a security platform which is capable of dif-
ferentiating cryptographically between the various media
— the underlying engine also allows different structural
components of a document or different document types
as they may occur in hypertext documents in the World
Wide Web to be operatedon using differentcryptographic
mechanisms.
Whataretherequirementsforthis–The Filter module
The paramountrequirementfor the above mentioned pro-
cedure is that the application (i.e. the multimedia or hy-
pertext system) is capable of handing down information
on media structure, structural elementsor documenttypes
to the security platform. An application document there-
fore must be split into its multimedia or structural com-
ponents which in turn must be passed on in PLASMA–
speciﬁc formats to the security platform. This task is per-
formed by the Filter.
The Filter is a module that is required by the security
platform yet logically resides within the application since
only the application has the knowledge required on for-
mat structures which vary from application to application
and may even diverge strongly from prior versions of the
same application. Therefore each application must pro-
vide its own PLASMA Filter. The data structures within
PLASMA for multimedia documents are constant and can
be addressed by each application in a similar fashion; it
is the application formats which cannot be addressed ade-
quately in a general form by PLASMA.
A Filter dissects a multimedia document of the applica-
tionintoitsmediaspeciﬁccomponentsbynotingthe loca-
tions of subcomponents (e.g. the locations of textual and
image parts) into a Script; the media speciﬁc parts of an
application document are thus transformed into their cor-
responding media speciﬁc data objects within PLASMA1.
If after reverting the cryptographic operations these me-
dia speciﬁc data objects of PLASMAare to be transformed
back into the plaintext document, the Filter requires this
Script.T h e Script provides the required information for
the Filter to assemble the plaintext documentinto its orig-
inal form; the PLASMA speciﬁc text objects are written
into positions originally containing text portions; similar
procedures are followed for image data and other media
speciﬁc objects within PLASMA. Figure 1 illustrates the
concept of a Filter.
PLASMAthusobtainsmediaspeciﬁcdataobjectsfromthe
Filter which are then to be processed using various cryp-
tographic mechanisms.
What further modules are required? PLASMA pro-
vides three security services for data transmissions in its
current implementation; they are non-repudiation, conﬁ-
dentiality and integrity. The object–orienteddesign of the
security platformallows the easy integrationof furtherse-
curity services such as the protection from replay attacks
or the digital signature creation2.
For PLASMA to be able to perform media speciﬁc opera-
tions on the application document data it is necessary that
the security platform can call upon different and media
speciﬁc protocols for the actual operation; this is realized
by the conceptof generic security services. A genericser-
vice non-repudiationnot only providesone ﬁxed protocol
for realizing a non-repudiable component but rather has
access to a number of different protocols which then per-
form the actual operation3.
The security platform must be capable of activating the
particular security services for each media type or struc-
tural element and their corresponding cryptographic pro-
tocol — these can and should be media speciﬁc protocols.
The simplest and most obvious approach for this is to im-
plement the corresponding parameters as self–sufﬁcient
modules of the platform. This results in the existence of
the modules medium, generic security services and cryp-
tographic protocols.
This architecture necessitates another module which cre-
ates the relations between these parameters; this rela-
tion must express which cryptographic protocol is to be
used for a speciﬁc medium, structural element or doc-
ument type with regard to an activated security service.
This relation is designated within PLASMA as the secu-
rity policy since this relation actually describes the policy
or mode of operation how different media are to be pro-
tected cryptographicallyduring transmission — it must in
someformbecapableofinﬂuencingtherelationsbetween
the other three modulesmedium, generic security services
and cryptographic protocols.
1The Script is stored together with the other media speciﬁc data objects into a Container by PLASMA— with the Container being a collection
object maintaining its subobjects as a list.
2The services non-repudiation and digital signature creation do not differ from a purely technical viewpoint; however, in the latter case the user
must be given an opportunity to actively conﬁrm that he wants to sign the given document.
3A cryptographic algorithm is referred to herein as a protocol since for example in the case of the DES algorithm the protocol for reverting the
encryption on behalf of the recipient is well deﬁned.Figure 1: The functionality of a Filter
The security policy in PLASMA is stored for each user as
anASCIIﬁleinthehomedirectoryofeachuser(FSP:for-
mal security policy), thus allowing each user to conﬁgure
this policy to meet his needs prior to the secured commu-
nication itself. The actual use of these security policies
in an ongoingcommunicationssession, their enforcement
and application will be explained later.
Theroughoutlineofthesecurityplatformisthereforepre-
determined to appear similar to Figure 2 at the left side.
It is obvious that further modules are required for the im-
plementation of “secure telecommunications” when con-
sidering the entirety of a security platform; such objects
as the Session object depicted in Figure 1 which imple-
ments a secure connection between two communications
partners within PLASMA — however, a detailed descrip-
tion of the object oriented design of PLASMA was already
given in [7] and shall not be repeated.
How are the modules activated? The generic security
services module could be activated by user activity or al-
ternatively, they might get activated sequentially. The
module cryptographic protocols must interact with the
underlying security technology which provides the ac-
tual implementation of the cryptographicalgorithms. The
mediummoduleobtainsits data from the Filter and differ-
entiate the data stream into several classes. The security
policy can be set directly by the user or by a security ad-
ministrator.
3.2 Secure telecommunications using
PLASMA
What are the basic requirements for secure telecommuni-
cations which are, of course, also realized in PLASMA?
First of all each user trying to establish a secure connec-
tion to one or multiple communications partners requires
access to his personal security–relevant data. These data
are stored in a specially secured area, access to which is
possible only using a valid PIN.
PLASMArequeststhisPINuponestablishmentof a secure
connection from the user. If the PIN entered is correct,
the storage area (which can best be thought of as a Smart-
Card) is opened and the user is then enabled to create a
secure communications session; otherwise the establish-
ment process is stopped at this point.
After this access control for the personal security relevant
data of the user which in particular contain cryptographic
keysit isalsonecessaryfortheusertogaincertaintyabout
the identity of the communications partner; this requires
a mutual authentication of the participating parties in the
best case, for which several protocols exist. In PLASMA,
this is implemented by means of the X.509 authentication
protocol [15].
Aftera successful X.509three-way-authenticationall par-
ticipants are well informed about the identity of their
counterparts: The web server knows which client wants
to access his data and conversely the client knows he has
contacted the correct web server — such information is
vital, particularly in the case of online transactions and
electronic commerce.
During the authentication the security policies, the public
asymmetric keys including certiﬁcates as well as the ses-
sion keys which are later used for transferring conﬁden-
tial data are exchanged4. The concept of security policies,
the exchange thereof in the authentication phase and the
subsequent reconciliation of the policies of both commu-
nicationspartnersare signiﬁcantelementsof PLASMA:a n
application documentis processed by PLASMA according
to the rules extracted from a Coordinated Security Pol-
icy CSP.T h eCSP is calculated from the security poli-
cies (FSPs) of the communicationspartners which are ex-
changed during the authentication phase.
4For the necessary background of cryptographic material refer for example to [15].Figure 2: Relevant modules and a possible security policy
A security policy which yields a relation between the
modules medium/structure, cryptographic protocols and
security services, thus assigning a cryptographic protocol
to a combination of a medium and an activated security
service is partitioned into two segments: the proﬁle and
the rule part.
The proﬁle part lists the cryptographicprotocols available
for each security service; this is useful since it may be
the case that one of the communicatingpartners is willing
only to communicate if SmartCards are used for storing
the cryptographic keys or even that one side wants to ex-
clude a simplistic cryptographicalgorithm from the nego-
tiation since it is deemed too insecure by that party.
The rule part lists the speciﬁc cryptographic protocols
which are to be used when encountering a given media
or structural type of an application document in order to
provide a requested security service5 (cf. Figure 2, right
side).
These security policies are created locally at each user’s
site and must be reconciled prior to the communication
proper and immediately after the mutual authentication
with communications partner; result is the CSP, men-
tioned before. To achieve this the set intersection of the
proﬁle parts of both policies is generated; in the case of
the rule parts the set union is created. This way only such
protocols are allowed for the communication which are
available on both sides of the communications channel
and onlythose cryptographicprotocolsare selected which
do not contradict any rule from either party.
After a successful authentication of the communications
partners the secure communicationitself between the par-
ticipatingparties maycommence. To achievesecure com-
munications, the security services conﬁdentiality, non-
repudiationandintegrityaremadeavailableby PLASMA6.
Using PLASMA it is now possible to send messages with
guaranteed integrity, i.e. the message will arrive prov-
ably at the recipient as it has been sent by the sender;
non-repudiable message passing means that the sender of
the message is uniquely identiﬁable by the recipient – be-
yond that the non-repudiation automatically includes the
integrity of the transmitted document; lastly, PLASMA is
capable of generating conﬁdential messages, i.e. mes-
sages which only authorized parties – the sender and the
recipient – are able to decrypt; all other parties can only
access the message in encrypted form.
The concept of security polices and, correspondingly,
the media–speciﬁc operations which also include the
structural properties of an application document are now
brought to the fore in the following: the generic security
services are activated by default sequentially by PLASMA
or after explicit user interaction — only the user may de-
cideatruntimewhetheradocumenttobetransmittedshall
be signed or protected against a loss of conﬁdentiality.
Consequently, a media speciﬁc cryptographic protocol
matching the activated security service and current me-
dia type must be selected which will then be used to meet
the security policies’ goal. To achieve this, the security
policy CSP is queried; this object is structured as a table
assigning each media type and generic security service a
speciﬁc cryptograpic protocol (cf. Figure 2 at the right
side).
The result of this query is a cryptographic protocol which
is subsequently activated by PLASMA. The data are trans-
mitted to this protocol which will then perform the cryp-
tographic operations speciﬁc to itself on these data.
Lastly, an integral part of each secure communications
session is the ability to dismantle such a connection prop-
erly in such a way as to disallow a possible intruder the
disruption of such a connection. Therefore this function-
ality has been integrated into PLASMA.
The possibility of user interaction is, similar to the media
speciﬁc operation on an application document, only pos-
sible if the security platform is situated logically close to
the application and is capable of communicating with the
5The “protocol” None is for document parts which should not be treated cryptographically.
6Through the object oriented design of the security platform PLASMA,as described in [7], it is easily possible to integrate further generic security
services into the platform.application. This goal has been reached within PLASMA
by taking the approach of locating the platform close to
the application based on the concept of the GSS-API [9],
[17].
An essential feature of any kind of security (in the crypto-
graphical sense) is the need for key management, i.e. the
proper administration and storage of the cryptographic
keys for each user. PLASMA is based on a security tech-
nologywhichimplementsthecryptograpicalgorithms(cf.
[7]). The implementationused as a security technologyin
PLASMA is SecuDe (cf. [16]); it is also possible to imple-
ment it using a different security technology, for example
utilizing the widely spread security package PGP [18].
Therefore the key management of PLASMA is fundamen-
tally dependent on the functionality of the underlying se-
curity technology. If these security technologies offer key
management themselves, PLASMA can merely integrate
it into itself; otherwise it needs to be modeled within the
platformitself; thesecuritytechnologiesPGP andSecuDe
for example offer proprietary utilities for certiﬁcation of
their keys and also deﬁne the makeup of certiﬁed keys
and certiﬁcates7.
4 The integration of PLASMA into
the World Wide Web
There are two well–distinguished layers in this W3 sce-
nario. The ﬁrst layer is that of the World Wide Web and
is situated between the browser, the proxy and the CGI
programs. In this layer, the client poses requests to the
server by activating a hyperlink; this hyperlink contains a
call to a CGI programwhich createsthe server’sresponse:
a HTML page which in turn contains a hyperlink to the
next CGI program in the sequence; this is the layer of the
HTTP protocol.
Thesecondlayer islocated betweenthe PLASMAapplica-
tions on the client and server sides. Here, data are passed
throughto the security platformso that PLASMAmayper-
form cryptographic operations on them. The protocol to
be used between the PLASMA applications is predeter-
mined by the application independent API of PLASMA
and may be considered separable into three phases: The
connection establishment and authentication phase, the
secure document transmission phase, and the connection
teardown phase.
When integrating PLASMA into the WWW the principal
problem is to pass the data on both sides from the WWW
layer onto the PLASMA layer. On the serverside this is
possible using CGI programs (Common Gateway Inter-
face [12]). When using a Mosaic browser, a CCI imple-
mentation (Common Client Interface [11]) on the client
side and CGI programming on the server side would be
possible; but here it is not possible to encrypt a client’s
request8: The client formulates his request by activating
a hyperlink to a server side page. This causes the service
request to be forwareded immediately to the server. In
addition to that, the request can also be transmitted to the
CCI interface “in parallel” (and therefore to PLASMA)–
but by then it is already too late to secure the request. A
PlugIn is another possibility for a browser to pass data to
another program and to read back the response from this
program. The PlugIn API is a proprietary extension of
the Netscape Navigator API and is not supported by other
browsers.
The PLASMA relevant data are embedded into the HTTP
protocol; to fulﬁll the requirements for browser indepen-
dent communicationsthere is to ﬁnd a way to pass the in-
formation onto PLASMA on the way from client to server
and conversely, i.e. to ﬁlter the data for the security plat-
form. Therefore it is not possible to use a special propose
ﬁlter module because HTTP is not aware of the ﬁlter.
The proxy, however, is well known of the HTTP proto-
col. Proxies in W3 buffering the informations from the
server on clientside and handing over these data to the
browser if they are completely arrived. So the proxy is
the component where the ﬁlter functionality can be inte-
grated. Therefore PLASMA has been integrated into the
World Wide Web using a proxy on the client side and us-
ing CGI programson the server side. This allows a secure
usage of the World Wide Web by all clients, no matter
what the browser of their choice might be (Netscape, Mo-
saic,...).
The data to be passed on to PLASMA can only be trans-
ferred on WWW via the HTTP protocol. Informations
intended for PLASMA are so-called PLASMA tokens.
There exists three different kinds of PLASMA token; the
PLASMA application has to discern whether the token is
an authentication token (type X509), a documentor Con-
tainer token (type Cont), or a Final token (type Finl).
It must be possible in any phase of the protocol between
the PLASMA applications to pass data from the WWW
layer onto PLASMA:
7The certiﬁcate structures used in SecuDe comply with the X.509 authentication framework [15] which requires the existence of certiﬁcation
authorities for the certiﬁcation of the asymmetric public keys.
8The Mosaic browser family offers a feature to access programs such as security platforms directly from the web client. To achieve this goal,
the CCI was deﬁned for the client side and on the server side the CGI speciﬁcation was established.Figure 3: Overview of the implemented proxy architecture
￿ In the authentication phase PLASMA on client side
must be able to retrieve the requests for embed-
ding the relevant PLASMA t o k e ni n t ot h eP LASMA
packet.
￿ In the document transmission phase cryptographic
operations must be performed on the informations
regarding which document the client or user re-
quested; therefore all hyperlinks of the previously
sent pages must be embedded in PLASMA packets.
￿ On the server side the CGI programs detect in the
requests the embedded PLASMA tokens so they
m a yb ep a s s e do nt ot h eP LASMA application.
￿ Subsequently they retrieve a HTML page including
a hyperlinkto the next CGI program in sequence as
well as the corresponding PLASMA token; this to-
kenmustthenbe passed to the PLASMAapplication
on the client side.
Because these PLASMAtokenscanonlytransferredonthe
WWW, they are transferred connected to elements of the
HTTP protocol, i.e. the replies of the server and the re-
quests of the clients. These HTTP elements include com-
ments ﬁeld not considered by the HTTP protocol which
can be used to ﬁll in the identiﬁcation tag for the ﬁlter-
ing process. These packages will be called in the follow-
ing as PLASMA packets. PLASMA packets contain conse-
quently an identiﬁcation tag which the CGI programs and
the proxy may detect.
The communicationbetween web client and web server is
not diverging from the normal HTTP protocol, therefore
thearchitecturepresentedherecanalsobeperformedwith
a ﬁrewall. It is, however, important to note that the proxy
used as a ﬁlter should not be the same proxy used for pro-
tecting a domain by a ﬁrewall. For a secure web scenario
every client user has to start the proxy on this machine,
where he started his own PLASMA system; every user
should start in the best case his own proxy.
4.1 The components of the proxy architec-
ture
The following section deals with the components of the
secure World Wide Web architecture using PLASMA and
a proxy and describes their responsibilities. The sepa-
rate components are PLASMA itself as a server process
on the client and server side, an application of PLASMA
on both sides which is capable of calling the application
independent interface functions, the proxy on the client
side and the CGI programson the server side which trans-
fer the data from the web server in their deﬁned states to
PLASMA. An overview of the components used in the
proxy architecture is given in Figure 3.
PLASMA as a server process The “philosophy” of the
World Wide Web can be summed up as follows: a client
establishes a channel to a WWW server using an URL re-
quest. The server responds to this request by sending the
requested information back to the client (if possible) and
closing the communications channel immediately there-
after. If the client wants to direct another request to the
server, a new communications channel must therefore be
established.
World Wide Web servers can call external programs via
the CGI, for example to perform database accesses or to
activate security software. The CGI speciﬁcation uses a
simple scheme for such calls; the CGI program must ter-
minate once it has processed the data and returned it to
the web server. The server in turn passes the data gen-
erated by the CGI program on to the client and “forgets”
everything about the transaction. Under normal circum-
stances this should not be a problem – unless a CGI pro-
gram needs to maintain state between two calls.
If one wants to use PLASMA to secure web communica-
tions on the server side, this means that, for example, theserver sends the request for the ﬁrst authentication token
to PLASMA via a CGI call. After serving this request, the
CGIprogramterminates,thereforePLASMAterminatesas
well. All data that would have to be stored to maintain a
secure link between client andserver are then lost (thisin-
cludes public keys and certiﬁcates as well as session keys
etc.).
Therefore PLASMA must run permanently on the server
side and it must not terminate once the CGI application
terminates when returning data to the web server. The
PLASMA system is therefore turned into a daemon pro-
cess; this allows it to maintain state information for sev-
eral communicationslinks across several CGI calls within
PLASMA9. Similar considerationsapply to the client side;
since theproxyalso maintainsonlytransientprocessesfor
each request, the state information for a secure communi-
cations link must be maintained in a PLASMA application
as well.
The CGI programs As has been mentioned before,
World Wide Web servers are able to adress external pro-
grams via the CGI. The call of a CGI program is usu-
ally initiated by activating a hyperlink that was found in a
HTML document previouslytransferred to the client side.
Since the activities of the CGI programs are well deﬁned
within the web scenario for each state of the protocol be-
tween sender and receiver, separate CGI programs were
deﬁned for each state.
Both CGI calls during the authentication phase are per-
forming identical tasks with regard to PLASMA, they do,
however, send different web pages as a response to the
client.
The CGI program called during document transfer gets
the requested document and decides whether or not the
client has access to the requested document by means of
the embedded client DName10. Lastly, there is a separate
CGI program which gets called if a request for terminat-
ing the session with the client is detected.
All CGI programsare searching for the PLASMA identiﬁ-
cation string and passing as the proxy on client side these
data onto PLASMA.
The proxy From the security perspective the proxy is
merely a ﬁlter deciding whether or not data must be
passed through PLASMA in this architecture; it searches
for a PLASMA identiﬁcation tag in each data packet it re-
ceives. Data containingthe PLASMAidentiﬁcationtag are
passedontoPLASMA, otherwisetheproxypassesthedata
on to the browser or the server, respectively, without in-
teracting with PLASMA.
In order to maintain the full functionality of a “normal”
proxy while embedding the necessary functionality, a
CERN HTTPD 3.0 was used as a base for embedding
the PLASMA modiﬁcations. Porting these modiﬁcations
to other proxy architectures should be fairly easy since
these are well embedded. The drawback inherent in this
approachis thenecessitytofollowstandardoperatingpro-
cedures, i.e. each browser request must be followed by a
response from the server.
Since the browser knows nothing of the security en-
hancement of the communications channel, all transac-
tionsmustbeperformedbetweentheproxyandtheserver.
Each request for PLASMA services must contain such a
string which allows the proxy to intercept it and send it
to the PLASMA application; the same goes for incoming
data from the server; therefore the identiﬁcation string is
inserted by the CGI program.
The PLASMA applications on client and server side
The PLASMA applications are the agents tasked with ac-
cepting transferred data from the proxy on the client side
and from CGI programson the server side. It passes these
data on to PLASMA and returns the output to the proxy or
to the CGI programs for secure transfer across the public
network. The PLASMA application gets passed only such
data packets which actually have to be modiﬁed crypto-
graphically by PLASMA in either the “to” or “from” di-
rection.
It is the responsibility of the PLASMA application to ana-
lyze received data packets and to pass these PLASMA to-
kenson to the securityplatformusingthe correctinterface
functions of the application independent interface [8].
Since PLASMA is required to operate permanently as
a background process, socket connections between the
proxy and the PLASMA application on the client side
as well as between the CGI programs and the PLASMA
server application are necessary.
4.2 The dynamic model
The following section details the interactions between the
separatecomponentsrequiredforsecurewebcommunica-
tions. The dynamicmodelis subdividedintothree phases:
the authentication phase, the secure transmission phase
and the connection teardown phase.
9PLASMAon both sides is capable of securing several simultaneous communications, so a web server is able to serve several clients simultane-
ously and similarly a client is capable of starting several simultaneous requests to different servers using secure connections.
10DNames are unique identiﬁers of the participating parties which are deﬁned in the X.500 standards suite (cf. [15]).Figure 4: The interactions in the authentication phase
The authentication phase The authentication phase
commences by the client establishing a secured connec-
tion with the server within PLASMA; to achieve this the
application on client side calls the PLASMA C–API func-
tion openSession(). For this the DName of the server
is required which is inquired in the ﬁrst request. The
server’s response contains the DName as well as a PIN
form into which the user at the client side will enter his
PIN.
Once the Session has been opened successfully, the
client calls the authentication function for the sender side
for the ﬁrst time (PlasmaConnect()). The result is a
PLASMAtoken of the type X509 w h i c hi st h e ns e n tt ot h e
server.
Upon receiving this PLASMA token (X509)a tt h es e r v e r
side, a session is created within PLASMA and the authen-
ticationtowards the client is continued(ﬁrst call of the au-
thentication for the receiver side (PlasmaAccept()).
The exact ﬂow of the protocol for authentication may be
gleaned from Figure 4. In this phase ﬁrst the PIN form in-
cludingtheserverDNamewill betransmittedto theclient.
Next the CGI programsX509 1.cgi and X509 3.cgi
are called on the server side, which are sending different
HTML pages to the client side; the ﬁrst HTML page is
only used for sending the hyperlink to the next CGI pro-
gram (X509 3.cgi), the next page already present the
offers of the server.
In this state only PLASMA token of type X509 are trans-
mitted – both applications have appropriate knowledge as
to which API calls need to be performed when receiving
PLASMA tokens of this type.Figure 5: Interactions in the data transmission phase
The document transmission phase After a successful
three-way-authenticationrequestsand replies betweenthe
web client and server may be transmitted securely. The
server offers its documents via the
secure offers page (cf. Figure 5); on the client side the
user selects a document and activates the corresponding
CGI programupon conﬁrmation. The call of the CGI pro-
gramisnotencrypted;however,theinformationregarding
which document has been requested by the user must be
encrypted at the client side11.
In this phase only tokens of the type Cont are trans-
mitted; the PLASMA application is wired to call the ﬁl-
ter function getDocument() for reverting the crypto-
graphic operations on this token type. In this phase plain-
text data are passed onto PLASMA for cryptographic op-
erations using the putDocument() API function.
The CGI program Cont.cgi gets called on the server
side. It decrypts the information on the requested docu-
ment and encrypts the document itself prior to transmis-
sion. The HTML pages sent in this phase represent the
documents or offers of the server; the exact protocol is
shown in Figure 5.
Connection teardown All HTML pages of a server al-
lowing secured communcationsusing PLASMA which of-
fer documents contain a hyperlink to the CGI program
Finl.cgi – refer to Figure 6 at the bottom. Upon acti-
vationofthishyperlinkthesession at theclientside is torn
down by calling the API function closeSession() of
PLASMA12.
11This requires the application on the client side to detect the condition that the API function putDocument() for cryptographic operations in
“to” direction must be called, therefore the request type ContRequest, which is also a PLASMApacket, was introduced.
12This requires the application on the client side to detect the condition that the API function for conncection shutdown must be called, therefore
the request type FinlRequest was introduced, also a PLASMApacket.Figure 6: Interaction opportunities for the user in the web demo
Theresult of thisconnectionteardownisa PLASMAtoken
of the type Finl which now must be sent to the server.
The application on the server side also recognizes that the
session is to be disconnected upon receiving this token of
type Finl and thus also calls closeSession().
5 Summary
In conclusionthe results ofthe integrationof the PLASMA
security platform into the World Wide Web are summed
up — these results are made possible by the implementa-
tion of the idea of high level security within PLASMA.
The just presented architecture allows a mutual authen-
tication of web clients and servers which may also be
achievedbymeansofothersecurityplatforms;afterasuc-
cessful authentication the server knows which client user
wants to obtain data from him and may use this identiﬁ-
cation by means of appropriate CGI programs to grant or
deny access (access control to the requested documents).
Requests and responses may now be secured — by locat-
ing the security platform close to the applicationthe inter-
actions of the user may be considered, i.e. the server can
offer its documents in such a way as to allow the client
to determine whether the document is to be sent conﬁden-
tially, non-reputiably or with integrity checks. Further-
more the server may predeterminewhich documentsneed
to be protected using speciﬁc security services; the web
page in Figure 6 exempliﬁes the opportunitiesfor interac-
tion with the user; the second image from the top may be
treated conﬁdentially and be transmitted non-reputiably;
interaction with the user is possible since the generic se-
curity services within the platform have been realized as
independent modules – these merely have to be activated
by a mouse click via the interface of PLASMA.
Finally, and this is the most signiﬁcant feature facilitated
byusing PLASMA, the differentmediaand differentstruc-
turesof the HTML documentsmaybe differentiatedcryp-
tographically. Using PLASMA it is possible to ensure that
forms, which may be containing a contract, will always
be signed – both by the server to make sure that the client
knows he is transferring his credit card number to an au-
thorized server as well as by the client side to make sure
that the client user has actually signed the “contract” in
that particular form; using PLASMA it is possible that forexample textual data is always integrity protected and im-
ages are protected against loss of conﬁdentiality during
transmission.
Finally it ensures that an unauthorizeddisruption of a ses-
sion by a client or server can be detected.
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scenario using the CCI system with a Mosaic browser and
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several crucial insights into the particular problems one
encounters when securing the web.
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